Question One. Whether after this Life any Sin can be Dismissed

1. “It is also wont to be asked     etc .” [Lombard, Sent. IV d.21 ch.1 n.1].

2. About this twenty first distinction I first ask this question, whether any sin can be dismissed after this life.

3. That it cannot:

Because no one dying just can afterwards sin; therefore      no one dying in sin can afterwards rise up. The consequence is plain: first by likeness, because to be able to sin and to rise from sin seem similar for any state; second by what is greater, for it is easier to fall than to rise up; third, because to rise up from sin seems to belong only to him who can merit, but he who cannot in some state fall cannot merit.

4. Again, no mortal sin can be remitted after this life, so neither any venial sin. The consequence is plain because they are of the same idea, since immaterial things only differ as to more and less.

5. Again, Damascene, Orthodox Faith ch.18 says, “What the fall was for angels, this death is for men.” But an angel after the fall cannot at all vary from the state in which he fell; therefore man too after death cannot at all vary from the state in which he dies.

6. Again, a venial sin can be dismissed by the least penalty provided it be voluntary, as by sprinkling with blessed water and the like; but the penalty of death is the greatest, because death is the ultimate of fearful things, Ethics 3.9.1115a26; therefore by it, if it be accepted voluntarily by this person about to die, every venial fault can be deleted; therefore after death none of them remain to be deleted for anyone.

7. If you say that death is inflicted for original sin and therefore it cannot be the penalty due for another sin, nor consequently can it have force to delete or dismiss venial sin - on the contrary: original sin is dismissed in baptism, which is specially ordained against it; therefore death is not in this man a penalty due for original sin; therefore as before [n.6].

8. To the opposite is the Master in the text [Sent. IV d.21 ch.1], and he proves it from Matthew 12.31, Luke 12.10, Mark 3.29-30: “He who sins against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him either in this age or the future one.” And the Master adds, “From this is given to understand, as the holy doctors had on to us, that certain sins will in the future age be dismissed.”

I. To the Question

A. About the Penalty Due for Sin Dismissed in this Life the Conclusion is Certain

9. In this question one conclusion is certain, namely that, when sin has been dismissed in this life, the penalty due for it can be paid after this life.

10. There is proof for this by reason, because no one in debt for a penalty is beatified; for either the penalties are to be paid along with glory or after glory; but in neither way, because penalty cannot either stand with glory or succeed to glory; therefore if anyone is at some time in debt for a penalty, he must first pay it before he be glorified. Now he who was in extremities worthily penitent, which is possible (as was said in the preceding distinction [d.20 nn.12-13, 24]), did not pay a worthy penalty for the sin of which he was penitent; therefore he will pay it after this life.

11. There are authorities too for this, which the Master adduces in the text [Lombard, Sent. IV d.21 ch.2]:

One from Augustine City of God ch.26 n.4, where he treats of I Corinthians 3.12, about those who build wood, hay, stubble. He says, “After the death of this body until the day of damnation or reward is reached, if in this interval of time the spirits of the dead, who have built wood, hay, stubble, are said to suffer a fire of tribulation that is transitory, burning up venial sins, I do not refute it.” And there follows, “That fire will be more grievous than anything a man could suffer in this life” [Exposition of Psalms ps.37 n.3].

12. The same [Ps.-]Augustine, On True and False Penitence (and it is in Gratian, Decretum p.2 cause 33 q.3 d.7 ch.6) about a late penitent says, “If he live with life and not die (understand this of the life of grace), we do not promise that he escape all penalty, for he who has put off the fruit of conversion to the next age is to be purged first with the fire of purgation; but this fire, although it not be eternal, is in a marvelous way grievous; for it excels every penalty that anyone has ever suffered in this life.”

13. And this opinion is stated by the Master, Sent. IV d.20 ch.2 n.1, “If,” he says, “they have departed before fulfilment of their penitence, they will feel the purgatorial fire and will be punished more heavily than if they had fulfilled penitence here.” And no wonder, because the less voluntary a penalty is the less satisfactory it is.

14. And this whole opinion about purgatory is founded on the word of the Apostle in I Corinthians 3.13, “he himself will be saved, but so as by fire” (he is speaking of someone dying imperfect).

B. About the Penalty for Sin not here Dismissed, and About Sin itself not here Dismissed

15. But the other point is not so certain, namely about sin not here dismissed, whether the penalty due for it can be paid in the future and so be remitted; secondly whether such a sin not here dismissed can be dismissed there.

1. About Mortal Sin

16. About the first point [n.15]: it is held as certain that this is not so for mortal sin, because the penalty due for mortal sin when not dismissed is the penalty of damnation, which will not be remitted.

2. About Venial Sin

17. About venial sin one needs to see what penalty corresponds to it according to divine justice.

a. Opinion of Others

18. And it is said [Alexander of Hales, ST II-II n.285 q.1] that an eternal penalty corresponds per se to venial sin, but per accidens a temporal one.

19. Proof of the first, that if someone is damned for mortal sin and along with venial sin, he will always be punished for the venial sin, otherwise there could be redemption in hell from some sin; but he will not be punished by God for it eternally unless an eternal punishment were justly due to it.

20. Proof of the second, that venial sin stands with the charity by which a man is ordained to the kingdom, and consequently for that reason a temporal penalty is due to venial sin.

b. Rejection of the Opinion

α. Against the first Proof

21. Against the first proof [n.19] in three ways:

First, because debt for eternal penalty does not stand along with charity; but along with charity stands not only venial sin not deleted after the act, but also the actually committed venial sin (this is plain according to everyone);     therefore etc     .

22. Proof of the minor [n.21], because through charity one is worthy of eternal life; if therefore along with this there stand a debt for eternal penalty, then one is at the same time worthy of eternal life and eternal penalty; but this is impossible, because no one can be debtor to eternal penalty for what he is ordained to glory in company with, because then glory and a penalty could stand together.

23. The major is also proved in another way, because after the act of mortal sin nothing remains of mortal sin save the debt of the penalty, as was said in d.14 q.1 nn.28-34. Therefore, if the debt of eternal penalty could stand along with grace, a mortal sin not remitted could, in the way in which it remains after the act, stand along with grace, and then the same person would be friend and enemy.

24. Again, second: the essential penalty of the damned is not the penalty of sense but the penalty of loss; but the penalty of loss is necessarily concomitant to any penalty, because no penalty can stand along with glory; therefore the debt for any eternal penalty includes the debt for the eternal penalty of loss, and consequently for the essential penalty of damnation; but damnation does not correspond to venial sin.

25. Again, third: venial and mortal sin are incommensurable in idea of malice or offense, for an infinity of venial sins, if they existed, would not equal one mortal sin in idea of offense, because neither would all of them turn one away from the end as a single mortal sin does. Therefore, the penalty that, according to justice, corresponds to mortal sin exceeds incommensurably and infinitely the penalty due to venial sin. But it does not incommensurably and infinitely exceed in intensity, because any infinite penalty exceeds or is exceeded finitely by another in intensity; therefore the excess will be in extension.Sc. the pains due as penalty to sin are not infinite in intensity (any actual pain will be determinate in how intense it is), so if the pains due to mortal sin exceed infinitely those due to venial sin, the infinity cannot be in intensity; so it must be in extension, that is, in the former lasting forever and the latter not. ⁶¹ Therefore eternal penalty is not due to venial sin.

26. And this conclusion I concede.

27. To the reasoning for the opposite [n.19] it is said in one way [Bonaventure, Aquinas, Richard of Middleton] that eternal penalty is due to venial sin per accidens (when it is conjoined with mortal sin), and not by reason of itself.

28. But this I do not understand, because God always punishes less than is deserving. And let it be that he would, according to rigor simply, punish up to what was fitting, it would be altogether unjust to inflict an eternal penalty for that for which in itself a temporal penalty is due. For however much it may be conjoined with another, this does not make it infinitely exceed the genus of its guilt; therefore, neither does a penalty exceeding to infinity justly correspond to it.

29. I say therefore that to venial sin, whether by punishing it here or in hell or elsewhere, is only due, whether in itself or per accidens, a temporal penalty, because it is in itself the sort of offense that in itself is sufficiently punished by temporal penalty.

30. Nor is it unacceptable for this penalty due to venial sin to have a limit in hell, because someone who is both truly penitent first, and fulfills part of the imposed penitence, and who, before he has fulfilled the whole of it, falls back into mortal sin, and dies in that mortal sin, will pay the penalty in hell for the remaining unfulfilled part of the penitence - but only a temporal penalty because, from the fact that, in the remission of prior sins, the debt of eternal penalty was changed into debt of temporal penalty, he is never in debt for those sins save for temporal penalty, and consequently when the total penalty is paid, he will be free of them.

31. Nor yet will there be redemption for him in hell, namely of the sin for which he is damned, because the debt of eternal penalty for that sin was never commuted into a debt of temporal penalty; and therefore the debt always remains, nor can that penalty ever be totally paid.

β. Against the Second Proof

32. About the second conclusion [n.20]:

It can be said that in one way it is so, because the remission of venial sin is nothing other than payment of the temporal penalty due for it.

33. The proof is that, after the act ceases, the guilt, which remains, is nothing but conviction for the due penalty; but being convicted for venial sin is nothing but being convicted for temporal penalty (from the preceding article [n.29]), and consequently, when the temporal penalty has been paid in purgatory for this venial sin, by this very fact is the venial guilt remitted.

34. But it is not so with mortal sin, because the penalty due for it cannot be totally paid unless the eternal penalty is first commuted into a temporal one; and this commutation is called remission of mortal guilt. But this remission only happens through an ordered voluntary displeasure of a sort that is not had after death.

Thus is one way plain as to how, after death, mortal sin cannot be remitted, but only the penalty due for mortal sin previously dismissed.

35. But venial sin previously committed and not dismissed can be dismissed after death, because the total penalty due for it can be paid, and thereby will it be remitted.

36. But this way is not satisfactory, because the saints seem to distinguish between remission of guilt of any sort and remission of penalty, and especially between remission of guilt and payment of the penalty due for the guilt.

37. It can be said in another way that venial sin in this life can be remitted, not only through interior or exterior penalty (because for this purpose that is not necessary), but through some act more accepted by God than the venial sin displease him - and this either referred by the doer himself to the remission of venial sin, or not referred by him but by God accepting it in its order thereto.

38. To the issue at hand: the works of this man who dies in charity, although after death they not be referred by him for the dismissing of the venial sin in which he died, and although too he not have any meritorious new act by which venial sin may be deleted, yet the works he did before can be referred by God to the remission of his venial sin after death.

39. And that in the following way: a cause that can be impeded does not, while it is impeded, realize its effect; however when it is not impeded it does realize it; but the merits of this man dying in charity would be sufficient cause for deletion of his venial sins, whether referred by himself or referred by God accepting the works in their order to this. Now his merits are, while he lives, impeded if he remains always actually in venial sin; after death, however, they are not impeded because then he is not continuing the act of venial sin; therefore his venial sins will be destroyed by them after this life.

C. Two Corollaries

40. From this follow two things: first, that at the moment of death venial sins are remitted, because the act of venial sin does not then remain and consequently the impediment then ceases; the other, that the venial sin of someone dying in charity is remitted in this life, unless he continue the act of venial sin until death or the moment of death.

41. This second one seems probable, unless you say God has ordained that the good merits of this person will be reserved in divine acceptation until the moment of death, when, of course, he ceases to be a wayfarer, and consequently that then God gives back to him the good corresponding to his merits, but not so for any prior instant when he was a wayfarer.

42. This is probable in other cases because, since any merit (as I believe) merits an increase of grace (because it merits some determinate degree of glory for which some degree of grace is required as preceding disposition), and since God does not always, after any meritorious act, increase grace proportionate to merit, it seems that the increase due to remitted merits he keeps in reserve until the moment of death.

43. And it is the same way about this deletion of venial sins, which is a sort of non-principal reward of these merits, just as it is also an increase of charity in such or such a degree.

44. And this is reasonable, because at that moment [sc. of death] a man first comes to be in another state; and the state of being wayfarer (or something concomitant to this sort of state) was what prevented the reward of merits being rendered to him. And it is not necessary to indicate here that this reserving for the moment of death is reasonable because a man is then, on account of impending very great trials, most of all in need - for this is not true, because at the moment of death the soul is separated from the body and consequently is not a wayfarer but at the term, nor consequently is it then exposed to trials.

45. If neither of these ways [n.40] is pleasing (neither the first, namely that it is the same thing for venial sin to be remitted and for the penalty due to it to be paid; nor the second, namely because by merits acquired as wayfarer and reserved in divine acceptation, venial sin may be destroyed at the moment of death), let another way be looked for, which it is difficult to find. For that there is some good movement by which, as by a disposition or merit by congruity or desert, venial sin be destroyed in the soul after death, does not seem consonant with theological doctrine, which posits that that state is immune from these things.

II. To the Initial Arguments

46. To the arguments.

To the first [n.3]: when taking ‘rising from sin’ to stand for ‘to be freed from sin’ I deny the consequence,

47. To the first proof [n.3], I say that there is no likeness, because ‘to sin’ is to act freely even as to this state of life; but to rise up, that is, to become immune from sin, does not require acting freely even as a wayfarer on the way; because, according to the first opinion [nn.18-20], to rise is only to pay the penalty, and this is to suffer it; or, according to the second opinion [nn.21-23], only through merits possessed as wayfarer before, and for that time accepted, is guilt now dismissed.

48. To the second proof of the consequence [n.3] I concede that it is easier to fall than to rise up, insofar as ‘rise up’ states a simply ordered act in the power of the one who rises; but in the remission of venial sin ‘rise up’ is not taken in this way [n.47].

49. To the third proof I say that it assumes something false, namely that ‘to rise’ is by a meritorious act that is then present. However, it is by a meritorious act that was present before, according to the second opinion; or by no meritorious act but only by suffering a deserved penalty for the sin, according to the first opinion.

50. To the second argument [n.4]: the consequence is not valid, and the reason is stated in the first opinion (and this according to that opinion). But according to the second opinion one would have to say that merits done in this life cannot be accepted at the moment of death for the deletion through them of mortal sin; because God has disposed mortal sin to be deleted only through the voluntary reception of the sacrament, or through some disposition meritorious, as it were, by congruity that is inherent then, or up to then, when the sin is destroyed. This is not so of him who dies in mortal sin.

51. To the proof [n.4] I say that although mortal and venial sin are of the same idea in genus of nature, or perhaps in malice of mores, just as the genus of virtue is distinct from what is of grace and what is sin (for it is not the same thing to be virtuous and vicious morally and to be just and a sinner theologically); but yet these are not of the same genus or idea in idea of divine offense; and so they are not remitted in the same way.

52. To the third [n.5]: the likeness goes this far, that as an angel when falling is at the term and not a wayfarer, so also is a man in death. But there need not be a likeness as to stable permanence in everything, but as to stable permanence in that which is principal in one who is already reaching the term. Off this sort is spiritual life by grace or spiritual death by mortal sin; and if a man die in the life of grace he will always live; but he who dies in mortal sin will remain so.

53. But about venial sin there need not be such stability, because venial sin is not something according to which the good or bad state of way or term is per se assessed. Or venial sin can stand with a good state and with a bad state, whether of the way or of the term; but when venial sin exists with a good state of the term, it must be deleted first before the ultimate term be fully possessed.

54. As to the fourth [n.6], it could well be conceded that death voluntarily accepted is a sufficient penalty as to the penalty of any venial sin, and perhaps as to a great part of the penalty due for mortal sins that have been dismissed. Nor is it a problem that it is a necessary penalty, because someone can voluntarily accept what is necessary. And so by this is what is said in the second opinion (that venial sin is deleted at the moment of death) consonant with what is said in the first opinion, that if it be remitted by the payment alone of the penalty, the penalty is paid in death; and in this way is venial sin remitted.